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Abstract Collective decision making involves on the one hand individual mental states
such as beliefs, emotions and intentions, and on the other hand interaction with others with
possibly different mental states. Achieving a satisfactory common group decision on which
all agree requires that such mental states are adapted to each other by social interaction.
Recent developments in social neuroscience have revealed neural mechanisms by which
such mutual adaptation can be realised. These mechanisms not only enable intentions to
converge to an emerging common decision, but at the same time enable to achieve shared
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underlying individual beliefs and emotions. This paper presents a computational model for
such processes. As an application of the model, an agent-based analysis was made of patterns
in crowd behaviour, in particular to simulate a real-life incident that took place on May 4,
2010 in Amsterdam. From available video material and witness reports, useful empirical data
were extracted. Similar patterns were achieved in simulations, whereby some of the param-
eters of the model were tuned to the case addressed, and most parameters were assigned
default values. The results show the inclusion of contagion of belief, emotion, and intention
states of agents results in better reproduction of the incident than non-inclusion.
Keywords Computational modelling · Collective decision making · Social neuroscience ·
Mirroring · Belief · Emotion · Intention · Crowd behaviour
1 Introduction
When it comes to group decision making versus individual decision making, it is often said
that ‘two heads are better than one’, and ‘the more the merrier’. Combining the individual
capabilities in a group setting is often perceived as a benefit for all parties involved. However,
deciding as a group comes with substantial challenges, as each group member has autono-
mous neurological processes, carrying, for example, private mental states such as emotions,
beliefs, and intentions, which may seem hard to combine within a group. So, viewed from a
distance, group decision making by reaching mutual agreement could be very hard. Yet, quite
often coherent decisions are made by groups, and group members even seem to feel good with
these decisions. In recent years, this seeming paradox has been resolved by developments in
the new area called social neuroscience; e.g., [6,7,15,16,26].
The crux is that these private mental states are not so static and isolated as they may seem;
they often show high extents of dynamics due to social interaction. In social neuroscience neu-
ral mechanisms have been discovered that indeed - often in unconscious manners - account
for mutual mirroring effects between mental states of different persons; e.g., [33,39,45]. For
example, an emotion expresses itself in a smile which, when observed by another person,
automatically triggers certain preparation neurons (also called mirror neurons) for smiling
within this other person, and consequently generates the same emotion. Similarly, mirroring
of intentions and beliefs can be considered.
In this paper group decision making in stressful circumstances (with emergency evac-
uations as an example) is addressed. In these circumstances, emotions have an important
interaction with the beliefs and intentions involved in a decision making process. The aim
was to design a human-like computational model which is biological plausible by exploit-
ing knowledge from social neuroscience about the relevant underlying mechanisms. Such
a model may be useful not only for purposes of prediction, but also to obtain more insight
in the dynamics of the social mechanisms and their emergent properties as described in a
noncomputational manner in social neuroscience.
Based on findings from neuroscience (Sect. 2), the computational model ASCRIBE (for
agent-based social contagion regarding intentions, beliefs and emotions) is introduced that
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not only incorporates mechanisms for mirroring emotions, intentions and beliefs between
different persons (Sect. 3), but also addresses how within a person beliefs and emotions affect
each other, and how they both affect the person’s intentions (Sect. 4). A number of example
simulations have been performed (Sect. 5).
As a case study the model was evaluated based on empirical data for crowd behaviour.
Behavioural patterns emerging in large crowds are often difficult to regulate. Various exam-
ples have shown how things can easily get out of control when many people come together
during big events. Especially within crowds, the consequences can be devastating when emo-
tion spirals (e.g., for aggression or fear) develop to high levels. In Sects. 6– 9, a computational
analysis is presented of the incident that happened on Dam square in Amsterdam at the fourth
of May in 2010, when large numbers gathered for the national remembrance of the dead (‘do-
denherdenking’). In the middle of a two minutes period of silence, one person started to shout,
causing panic to occur among the people present. What happened there, as a result of a panic
spiral, was a relatively mild incident in which ‘only’ a number of persons ended up in hospi-
tals with fractures and bruises. The model ASCRIBE was extended to incorporate this crowd
movement context (Sect. 7). To tune the latter model to specific characteristics, a specific
automated parameter tuning method was used (Sect. 8). It is shown how the model is able to
simulate this outburst of panic and its consequences (Sect. 9). Finally, the model is compared
to an epidemiological model in Sect. 10, and Sect. 11 concludes the paper with a discussion.
2 Background from social neuroscience
As the aim was to obtain a biologically plausible human-like model, first some of the key
concepts from social neuroscience are briefly reviewed. Within neuroscience it has been dis-
covered that certain neurons have a mirroring function (e.g., [14,32,33,39,42–45]). In the
context of the neural circuits in which they are embedded, these neurons show both a function
in preparation for certain actions or bodily changes and a function to mirror similar states
of other persons: they are active also when the person observes somebody else intending or
performing the action or body change. This includes expressing emotions in body states, such
as facial expressions. These neurons and the neural circuits in which they are embedded play
an important role in social functioning (e.g., [14,33,39,45]). When mental states of other
persons are mirrored by some of the person’s own states, which at the same time play a role in
generating their own behaviour, then this provides an effective basic mechanism for persons
to fundamentally affect each other’s mental states and behaviour. These discoveries are the
basis for an exciting new research area, called social neuroscience.
A person’s cognitive states usually induce emotions, as described by neurologist Damasio,
[12,13]; for example:
‘Even when we somewhat misuse the notion of feeling—as in “I feel I am right about
this” or “I feel I cannot agree with you”—we are referring, at least vaguely, to the feeling
that accompanies the idea of believing a certain fact or endorsing a certain view. This
is because believing and endorsing cause a certain emotion to happen.’ ([13], p. 93).
Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis; cf. [1,10,11,13], is a theory on decision making
which provides a central role to emotions felt. Within a given context, each represented deci-
sion option induces (via an emotional response) a feeling which is used to mark the option.
For example, a strongly negative somatic marker linked to a particular option occurs as a
strongly negative feeling for that option. Similarly, a positive somatic marker occurs as a
positive feeling for that option ([10], pp. 173–174).
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Fig. 1 The interplay of beliefs, emotions and intentions in social context
Table 1 Intra-agent and inter-agent interactions
From To Agent Description
Belief Emotion Intra-agent Affective response on information; for
example, on threats and possibilities to
escape
Emotion Emotion Inter-agent Emotion mirroring by nonverbal and verbal
interaction; for example, fear contagion
Emotion Belief Intra-agent Affective biasing; for example, adapting
openness, amplification extent and
orientation
Belief Belief Inter-agent Belief mirroring by nonverbal and verbal
interaction; for example, diffusion of
information on threats and possibilities to
escape
Belief Intention Intra-agent Cognitive response on information; for
example, aiming for an exit that is believed
to be reachable
Emotion Intention Intra-agent Somatic marking of intention options; for
example, giving options that feel bad a low
valuation
Intention Intention Inter-agent Intention mirroring by nonverbal and verbal
interaction; for example, contagion of
tendency to go in a certain direction
In Fig. 1 an overview of the interplay of the different states within the model for collective
decision making is shown.
It is assumed that at the individual level the strength of an intention for a certain deci-
sion option depends on the person’s beliefs (cognitive responding) and emotions (somatic
marking) in relation to that option. Moreover, it is assumed that beliefs may generate certain
emotions (affective responding), for example fear, that in turn may affect the strength of
beliefs (affective biasing). Note that it is assumed that these latter emotions are independent
of the different decision options. Given this, to obtain collectiveness of the decision making
a mirroring mechanism as briefly described above is used in three different ways; see also
Fig. 1 and Table 1:
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• Mirroring of emotions is a mechanism for how fear and emotions felt in different indi-
viduals about a certain considered decision option mutually affect each other,
• Mirroring of beliefs is a mechanism transferring information on the extent to which dif-
ferent individuals believe certain information
• Mirroring of intentions is a mechanism transferring information between individuals on
the strength of action tendencies (e.g., [23], p. 70) for certain decision options
These mechanisms describe not only how over time the individual decision intentions of
group members may converge to a common group intention, but also how this relates to a
basis of shared beliefs and shared emotions developed within the group at the same time.
These shared belief and emotion states provide a solid grounding and robustness for the
decisions. Indeed, the computational model introduced in Sects. 3 and 4 shows these types
of patterns, as illustrated in Sect. 5.
3 A computational model for mirroring of mental states
A main building block of the computational model is a general model describing at an abstract
level the mirroring of a given mental state S (for example, an emotion, belief or intention).
This is based upon the model that was also used as a generic building block in [29,31]. An
important element is the contagion strength γSB A from person B to person A in a group. This
denotes how much the state S of A is influenced by the state S of B. It is defined by
γSB A = εSB αSB A δS A (1)
Here, εSB is the personal characteristic expressiveness of the sender B for S, δS A the per-
sonal characteristic openness of the receiver A for S, and αSB A the interaction characteristic
channel strength for S from sender B to receiver A. In order to determine the level qS A of
state S in an agent A, the following calculations are performed. First, the overall contagion
strength γS A from the group towards agent A is calculated:
γS A = B =A γSB A (2)
This value is used to determine the weighed impact qS A∗ of all the other agents upon state S
of agent A:
qS A∗(t) = B =A γSB A qSB(t)/γS A (3)
The dynamics of the different mechanisms involved are modelled by dynamical relationships
using the following general pattern:
YA(t + t) = YA(t) + γ < change_expression > t
Here the change of Y is specified for a time interval between t and t + t ; the γ represents
the speed of the adjustment processes. Applied to the variable qS A(t) for YA(t) the following
is taken:
< change_expression >= f (qS A∗(t), qS A(t)) − qS A(t)
where f (qS A∗(t), qS A(t)) is a combination function. Therefore for the case considered:
qS A(t + t) = qS A(t) + γS A
[ f (qS A∗(t), qS A(t)) − qS A(t)
]
t (4)
Two additional personal characteristics determine how much this external influence actually
changes state S of agent A, namely the tendency ηS A to absorb or to amplify the level of
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Table 2 Parameters and states qS A Level for state S for person A
εS A Extent to which person A expresses state S
δS A Extent to which person A is open to state S
ηS A Tendency of person A to absorb or amplify state S
βS A Positive or negative bias of person A on state S
αSB A Channel strength for state S from sender B to receiver A
γSB A Contagion strength for S from sender B to receiver A
a state and the bias βS A towards increasing (upward) or reducing (downward) impact for
the value of the state. Based on this the combination function f (qS A∗(t), qS A(t)) used was
taken as:




1 − (1 − qS A∗(t)
)
(1 − qS A(t))
)
+(1 − βS A)qS A∗(t)qS A(t)
] + (1 − ηS A)qS A∗(t) (5)
By (4) the new value for the state S at time t + t is calculated from the old value at t , plus
the change of the value based upon the transfer by mirroring. This change is defined as the
multiplication of the overall contagion strength γS A times the difference of a combination
function of qS A∗ and qS A with qS A. The combination function used has a component for
amplification (after ηS A(t)) and one for absorption. The amplification component depends
on the tendency of the person towards more positive (part multiplied by βS A(t) or negative
(part of equation multiplied by 1 − βS A(t) side). Table 2 summarizes the most important
parameters and states within this general model.
4 Modelling the interplay of beliefs, emotions and intentions
This section describes a computational model for the interplay of emotions, beliefs and inten-
tions in a group of persons in the context of collective decision making. In this model the
general model described in Sect. 3 is specialized for three different types of mental states S,
namely beliefs, emotions, and intentions. In principle this is a large number of variants of Eq.
(4) above for all persons A in a group and all states S, indicated by belief(X), fear, emotion(O),
intention(O) for information X and options O . However, in addition, at the individual level
interactions between these different states are modelled, as depicted in Fig. 1; see also Table 1
for a brief explanation of all interactions in the model. This means that the model obtained by
forming specializations of the generic model from Sect. 3 is modified in order to incorporate
the internal interactions between the different types of states. For example, as can be seen in
Table 3, the effect of beliefs on fear of a person has to be combined with the effect of fear of
other group members on the own fear. This will be explained in more detail in the remainder
of this section.
4.1 The effect of emotions on beliefs
To model the effect of emotions on information diffusion, below the personal character-
istics δS A, ηS A and βS A for a belief state S = belief(X) are not assumed constant, but are
instead modelled in a dynamic manner, depending on emotions. Personal characteristics
εbelie f (X)A, δbelie f (X)A, ηbelie f (X)A, βbelie f (X)A and interaction characteristic αbelie f (X)B A
are parameters in the model as described in Sect. 3. One additional category is introduced
here, namely informational state characteristics rX A denoting how relevant, and pX A denot-
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Table 3 The different types of processes in the model
From S To S′ Type Description
Belief(X) Fear Internal Affective response on information; for
example, on threats and possibilities to
escape
Emotion(O) fear Emotion(O) fear Interaction Emotion mirroring by nonverbal and verbal
interaction; for example, fear contagion
Fear Belief(X) Internal Affective biasing; for example, adapting
openness, amplification extent and
orientation
Belief(X) Belief(X) Interaction Belief mirroring by nonverbal and verbal
interaction; for example, of information on
threats and options to escape
Belief(X) Intention(O) Internal Cognitive response on information; for
example, aiming for an exit that is believed
to be reachable
Emotion(O) Intention(O) Internal Somatic marking of intention options; for
example, giving options that feel bad a low
valuation
Intention(O) Intention(O) Interaction Intention mirroring by nonverbal and verbal
interaction; for example, of tendency to go
in a certain direction
ing how positive information X is for person A. An assumption made for the model is that
the intensity of the fear state of a person will affect his ability to receive information, by
affecting the value of the individual person characteristics; in particular, a high level of fear
affects βbelie f (X)A, ηbelie f (X)A and δbelie f (X)A. First the effect of fear upon the openness for
a belief belief(X) (characterized by a relevance rX A of information X for A) is expressed:
δbelie f (X)A(t + t) = δbelie f (X)A(t) + μ · (1/1 + e−σ(q f ear,A(t)−τ ))
· [(1 − (1 − rX A) q f ear,A(t))δbelie f (X)A(t)
] · t (6)
If q f ear,A is lower than threshold τ (on the interval [0,1]), it will not contribute to the value of
δbelie f (X)A. If q f ear ,A has a value above τ , the openness will depend on the relevance of the
information: when the relevance is high, openness will increase, while if the relevance is low,
openness will decrease. In all formulae, μ is an adaptation parameter. This proposed model
corresponds to theories of emotions as frames for selective processing, as described in [22,37].
A distinction between amplification values for different types of information is also made,
depending on the emotional state fear. The dynamics for the characteristic ηbelie f (X)A(t)
modelling the amplification or absorption of belief(X) are described as follows:
ηbelie f (X)A(t + t) = ηbelie f (X)A(t) + μ · (1/1 + e−σ(q f ear ,A(t)−τ))
· [rX A · (1 − pX A) · (q f ear ,A(t)ηbelie f (X)A(t))
] · t (7)
The emotion of fear only has an influence when it is above the threshold. In that case the
parameter only changes for relevant, non-positive information for which the parameter starts
to move towards the value for the emotion of fear (meaning this type of information will be
amplified). This property represents an interpretation of [9] on how emotion can result in
selective processing of emotion-relevant information.
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The bias of a person is also influenced by its emotion, but in addition depends on the
content of the information, which can be either positive or negative:
βbelie f (X)A(t + t) = βbelie f (X)A(t) + μ · (1/1 + eσ(q f ear ,A(t)−τ )) · (1 − qbelie f (X)A(t))
· [(ζA · pX A + (1 − ζA) · (1 − pX A)) − βbelie f (X)A(t)
] · t (8)
Parameter τ is a number between 0 and 1 and represents a threshold for q f ear : when q f ear >
τ, then q f ear ,A has an influence on the bias βbelie f (X)A(t). Parameter ζA is a personality
characteristic; if ζA = 1, represents a person who is optimistic when he/she has a lot of fear:
positive information will be strengthened more and negative information will be weakened
more. The reverse happens when ζA = 0, this represents a person who is more ‘pessimistic’
when experiencing fear: negative information will be strengthened and positive information
will be weakened. Both personality characteristics seem to exist in people: a bias towards the
negative side of information in case of experiencing a high level of fear, corresponds with the
narrowing hypothesis from Frederickson’s broaden-and-build theory in [21]. Others have a
bias towards more positive information and emotions. Leaders could use this ability moti-
vate their followers in times of crisis, as positive information and emotions broaden people’s
mindset [22], and focusing on positive information and emotions can contribute positively to
individual’s mental states (including attention and cognitive capacity) and resources [21]. The
dynamically changing ‘parameters’ δbelie f (X)A(t), ηbelie f (X)A(t), βbelie f (X)A(t) are used in
the equation describing the dynamics of the belief state belief(X):
qbelie f (X)A(t + t) = qbelie f (X)A(t) + γbelie f (X)A(t)
· [ f (qbelie f (X)A ∗ (t), qbelie f (X)A(t)) − qbelie f (X)A(t)
]
t (9)
where the combination function f (qS A∗(t), qS A(t)) used is taken in a dynamic manner as:
f (qbelie f (X)A∗(t), qbelie f (X)A(t)) = ηbelie f (X)A(t)[βbelie f (X)A(t)
· (1 − (1 − qbelie f (X)A∗(t)
) (
1 − qbelie f (X)A(t)
))
+(1 − βbelie f (X)A(t)) qbelie f (X)A∗(t)qbelie f (X)A(t)]
+(1 − ηbelie f (X)A(t)) qbelie f (X)A∗(t) (10)
Note that since it depends on δbelie f (X)A(t), also γbelie f (X)A(t) becomes dynamic.
4.2 The effect of beliefs on emotions in the dynamics of fear
Besides modelling the influence of emotion upon the information contagion in the previ-
ous Section, the opposite direction is investigated in this Section: emotions being influenced
by information. This influence is modelled by altering the overall weighed impact of the
contagion of the emotional state for fear. This is expressed as follows:
q f ear ,A∗(t) = νA ·
(∑
B =A γ f ear B A · q f ear B/γ f ear A
)
+(1 − νA) ·
(∑
X
ωX, f ear ,A. (1 − pX A) · rX A · qbelie f (X)A
)
(11)
Here the influence depends on the impact from the emotion fear by others (the first factor,
with weight vA) in combination with the influence of the belief present within the person. In
this case, information has an increasing effect on fear if it is relevant and non positive. This
q f ear ,A∗(t) is used in the equation describing the dynamics of fear:
q f ear A(t + t) = q f ear A(t) + γ f ear A
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with
f (q f ear A∗(t), q f ear A(t)) = η f ear A
[
β f ear A
(
1 − (1 − q f ear A∗(t)
) (
1 − q f ear A(t)
))
+ (1 − β f ear A) qS A∗(t)qS A(t)
]
+ (1 − η f ear A) q f ear A∗(t) (13)
4.3 The effects of beliefs and emotions on intentions
The abstract model for mirroring described above applies to emotion, belief and intention
states S for an option O or the situation in general, but does not describe any interplay
for intentions yet. Taking the Somatic Marker Hypothesis on decision making as a point
of departure, not only intentions of others, but also own emotions affect the own inten-
tions. To incorporate such an interaction, the basic model is extended as follows: to update
qintention(O)A for an intention state S relating to an option O , both the intention states of
others for O and the qemotion(O)A(t) values for the emotion state S′ for O are taken into
account. These intention and emotion states S and S′ for option O are denoted by OI and
OE, respectively:
Level of fear of person A: q f ear A(t)
Level of emotion for option O of person A: qemotion(O)A(t)
Level of intention indication for option O of person A: qintention(O)A(t)
Level of belief supporting option O of person A: qbelie f s f or(O)A(t)
Here qbelie f s f or(O)A(t) denotes to aggregated support for option O by beliefs of A; it is
defined as
qbelie f s f or(O)A(t) =
∑
X
ωX O Aqbelie f (X)A/
∑
X
ωX O A (14)
where ωX O A indicates how supportive information X is for option O . The combination of
the own (positive) emotion level and the rest of the group’s aggregated intention is made by
a weighted average of the two:
qintention(O)A∗∗(t) = (ωO I A1/ωO I E B A) qintention(O)A∗(t)
+(ωO E A2/ωO I E B A) qemotion(O)A(t)
+(ωO B A2/ωO I E B A) qbelie f s f or(O)A(t) (15)
γintention(O)A
∗ = ωO I E B Aγintention(O)A (16)
where ωO I A1,ωO B A2 and ωO E A2 are the weights for the contributions of the group intention
impact (by mirroring), the own emotion impact (by somatic marking), and the own belief
impact on the intention of A for O , respectively, and
ωO I E B A = ωO I A1 + ωO E A2 + ωO B A2
The combination of the own belief level and the rest of the group’s aggregated emotion for
a certain option O is made by a weighted average of the two
qemotion(O)A∗∗(t) = (ωO E A1/ωO E B A) qemotion(O)A∗(t)
+ (ωO B A1/ωO E B A) qbelie f s f or(O)A(t) (17)
γemotion(O)A
∗ = ωO E B A γemotion(O)A (18)
where ωO E A1 and ωO B A1 are the weights for the contributions of the group emotion impact
(by mirroring), the own belief impact on the emotion of A for O , respectively, and ωO E B A =
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ωO E A1 + ωO B A1. Then the overall model for the dynamics of emotions and intentions for
options becomes:
qemotion(O)A(t + t) = qemotion(O)A(t) + γintention(O)A∗
· [ηemotion(O)A(βemotion(O)A(1 − (1 − qemotion(O)A∗∗(t))
(1 − qemotion(O)A(t)))
+(1 − βemotion(O)A)qemotion(O)A∗∗(t)qemotion(O)A(t))
+(1 − ηemotion(O)A)qemotion(O)A∗∗(t) − qemotion(O)A(t)
] · t
(19)
qintention(O)A(t + t) = qintention(O)A(t) + γintention(O)A∗
· [ηintention(O)A(βintention(O)A
(1 − (1 − qintention(O)A∗∗(t))(1 − qintention(O)A(t)))
+(1 − βintention(O)A)qintention(O)A∗∗(t)qintention(O)A(t))
+(1 − ηintention(O)A)qintention(O)A∗∗(t) − qintention(O)A(t)
] · t
(20)
5 Some example simulation results for a fictional case study
In this section, some example results of a small fictional case study will be presented. The
goal of the case study was to investigate if the computational model can simulate the interplay
of emotions, intentions and beliefs, as described in neuroscientific, social and psychologi-
cal literature. The computational model was implemented in Matlab in the context of an
evacuation scenario (see Appendix A1 for the complete Matlab specification).
The example scenario is expressed as follows: at the end of a working day in an office, the
fire alarm goes off and all the persons that are in the building need to evacuate immediately.
At the time of the alarm, 3 teams of each 3 people are present on different floors, as can be
seen in Fig. 2. Persons can communicate with each other when they are on the same floor, or
they can communicate to each other through their personal device, which is equipped with a
tool for sharing emergency information over a short distance. Communication through such
personal devices can only occur in case the distance is three floors or less. The building has
four emergency exits, three on the ground floor and one on the fifth floor via a skyway to
another building. If an exit is accessible, the information is rated as ‘positive’ information in
the model, if not accessible then the information is rated ‘not positive’. In the formalization,
this leads to the following information state characteristics: pExit X = 1 for accessible exits
and pExit X = 0 for blocked exists. The relevance of this information for survival is always
one, i.e. rExit X = 1.
5.1 An example scenario
In the example scenario, the three persons located on the top floor know that exit four is
available (i.e. they have a belief of one in information pExit4 = 1), whereas the three persons
on the middle floor do not have any strong beliefs about any of the emergency exits. The
three on the first floor know the situation of the exits one and two at the first floor, thus they
have beliefs of strength one concerning those exists. In this case, the first exit is blocked and
1 http://www.cs.vu.nl/~mhoogen/social-diffusion/AppendixA-ICONIP10.pdf.
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Fig. 2 The location of three teams in a building of six floors with four exits
the second is accessible, therefore pExit1 = 0 and pExit2 = 1. They do not know anything
about exit three, therefore a belief of strength 0 is present concerning exit three. Besides these
values, all other values are set to 0.5 with respect to the beliefs to indicate that they know the
exits are there but do not know specifically whether the exit is accessible or not. Moreover,
the intentions of all agents are initially set to zero (i.e. they start with no specific intention
to leave the building via any of the exits) and the emotions to 0, 1, 0, and 1 for exit 1, 2, 3,
and 4 respectively (since exit one and exit three represent negative information, the emotion
for that option is not positive). Finally, for the emotion of fear the agents on the first floor
have no fear, on the middle floor they have maximum fear, and on the top floor medium fear
is present. Furthermore, the initial belief about the situation itself is 0.5. Regarding all the
parameter settings as described before: each agent has the same initial set of parameters, and
these can be found in the Matlab specification as shown in Appendix A.
Figure 3 shows the change of the values of the beliefs, intentions, and emotions. The top
four rows represent the values related to the four exits. Here, the values for all agents during
the simulation runs are shown. The y-axis of the graphs represents all nine persons, who
have values for certain variables, stated on the z-axis. The values develop over time, which is
represented by the x-axis. At the bottom row of the figure, diagrams with the amount of fear
and the judgment of the entire situation are shown. It can be seen that fear spreads quickly,
resulting in a very negative judgment of the situation by all agents. For exit one the belief
about the exit being an option for evacuation eventually stabilizes at a relatively low value
due to the fact that no human has a good feeling for that option (although in the beginning the
emotions are slightly pulled upwards as well as the intention, due to the very strong belief of
the three agents at the first floor). For exits two and four a very strong belief occurs rapidly
for all agents as well as a very strong intention and the positive emotions also remain high.
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Fig. 3 Simulation results for an example scenario
Finally, for exit three the agents on the first floor get a slightly stronger belief, intention,
and emotion due to the fact that the other agents have a belief with value 0.5 about the exit.
Eventually however, the values return to a rather low value again due to the fact that the
others have lowered their value again. Without the ability to communicate with each other
using personal devices, the beliefs, intentions, and emotions would not have been influenced
by those on the other floors.
5.2 More systematic variations
The context of this case study was used to explore whether under a variety of parameter
settings patterns emerge as expected.
5.2.1 The effect of information on fear
A first prediction about the interplay of emotions, intentions and beliefs, according to the
computational model is derived from formula (11): it is expected that if a person experiences
a situation as dangerous, then this persons’s fear level should increase. Simulations where
the persons believed that the situation is dangerous were compared with simulations where
they believed that that situation was not dangerous. The result of these simulations were that
if persons believe that the situation is not dangerous (pbelie f (s)A = 1), then q f ear A(t) goes
to 0, meaning that the persons will experience no fear. If the persons believe that the situation
is dangerous (pbelie f (s)A = 0), then q f ear A(t) increases to 1, meaning that the persons will
increase their experience of fear, when they consider the situation as dangerous. This result
corresponds with our expectation.
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5.2.2 The effect of emotion on beliefs
According to formulas (6), (7), and (8) the level of fear that a person is experiencing, can
have an effect on the way a person processes information. More precisely: it is expected that
when q f ear A(t) is above threshold τ, then the emotion fear should have an effect on the way
persons process information. Multiple simulations were run to test this. In the simulations,
the threshold τ was set to 0.5 and the initial value of q f ear A(t) is below or above threshold τ,
for example, 0.1 or 0.7. Whenever q f ear A(t) is above the threshold τ (either from the start, or
at a later time point), δbelie f (X)A(t), ηbelie f (X)A(t) and βbelie f (X)A(t) start to change indeed.
Here results will be briefly presented where ζ was one.
• The openness δbelie f (X)A(t) becomes one or stays one, this is according to the model,
because when ζ = 1 and rbelie f (s)A = 1 (the information is relevant for survival),
δbelie f (X)A(t) should increase.
• The bias factor βbelie f (X)A(t) increases for the situation, exit one and three (which are not
accessible), but decreases for exit two and four (which are accessible). This is what was
expected, because the higher pbelie f (s)A is (meaning the more ‘positive’ information is),
the lower βbelie f (X)A(t) should become (meaning information will be spread weaker by
this person), the lower pbelie f (s)A is, the higher βbelie f (X)A(t) should become (meaning
strengthening the spread of negative information).
• The amplification extent ηbelie f (X)A(t) increases differently for the situation, where exit
1 and 3 are not accessible. For this situation it goes towards one and it increases more,
the further the agents are away from the exit. This is according to expectation, because
ηbelie f (X)A(t) should only increase if pbelie f (s)A = low and rbelie f (s)A = high, in these
instances, pbelie f (s)A = 0 and rbelie f (s)A = 1. For exits two and four, pbelie f (s)A = 1
and rbelie f (s)A = 1. In that case ηbelie f (X)A(t) should not increase, and that is what is
happening correctly in this evacuation scenario.
5.2.3 The effects of a combination of beliefs and emotions
In the simulations it was found that the combination of emotions and beliefs decreases the
level of qemotion(X)A(t) more than they do separately. This effect was expected from formula
(17) for qemotion(X)A(t)∗∗. For example, here one can see that in this situation the combina-
tion of emotions and beliefs makes qemotion(X)A(t) increase more, than when beliefs are not
combined with emotions.
6 A real world case study: the May fourth incident
The computational model mentioned above was applied to the May fourth incident in Amster-
dam (The Netherlands). The incident took place in the evening of May fourth 2010, when
approximately 20,000 people gathered on Dam Square in Amsterdam for the National
Remembrance of the dead. What follows is a short description of the events.
At 20:00 h everyone in the Netherlands, including the crowd on Dam Square, was silent for
two minutes to remember the dead. Fences and officials compartmented the 20.000 people on
Dam Square. At 20:01 a man in the crowd on Dam Square disturbed the silence by screaming
loudly. People standing directly near him could see that this man looked a bit ‘crazy’ or ‘lost’,
and they did not move. Those not within a few meters of the screaming source, started to
panic and ran away from the man that screamed. The panic spread through the people that
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were running away who infected each other with their emotions and intentions to flee. This
panic was fuelled by a loud ‘BANG’ that was heard about three seconds after the man started
screaming. Queen Beatrix and other royal members present were escorted to a safe location
nearby. In total, 64 persons got injured: they got broken bones and scrapes by being pushed,
or got run over by the crowd. The police exported the screaming man and got control over
the situation within two minutes. After 2½ minutes, the master of ceremony announced to
the crowd that a person had become ill and had received care. He asked everybody to take his
or her initial place again, and to continue the ceremony. After this, the ceremony continued.
Eyewitness reports were collected on site. Below, parts of their transcripts are freely
translated in English:
Question: describe what happened in your own words.
Eyewitness 1: “[…] The moment people in front of me started to run, I panicked. I
could not see why these people ran away. It seemed they were running away from some-
thing. I immediately thought back to what happened the year before in Apeldoorn [the
witness refers to the failed attack on the Royal Family the year before, when someone
drove his car into the crowd towards the Royal Family and killed eight people]. After
the yelling, I heard a lot of noise, which later turned out to be fences that fell down…
[…] The few seconds when people started to run away after the scream, I found the
most scary.”
Eyewitness 2: “[…] The moment the man started screaming, I ‘choked’ of fear: I
thought that someone wanted to disrupt the ceremony with an attack and I was afraid
that we, including our little daughter, would be run over.”
Eyewitness 3: […] “My panic was growing when people behind us ran into the fences
in ‘blind panic’. The moment I saw fences falling down en people tripping over them
was the peak of my panic. After that, I felt shocked and surprised, because people
shouted ‘Not again?!’. We helped people get back up on their feet and after that I fell
into the arms of my friends and tried to relax. Because of the adrenaline, I could not
manage easily. I had a bad feeling about the applause after the message of the master of
ceremony: the message that somebody became ill and was taken care off, was clearly
a lie and the applause was out of place.”
Question: how did you interpret the scream?
Eyewitness 1: “Like an emergency call or yell of somebody with the wrong intentions.”
Eyewitness 2: “As a suicide terrorist who braces himself before he will act.”
Eyewitness 3: “As a tortured soul that lost somebody and could only express this by
screaming.”
Question: did you get information about the situation from people around you?
Eyewitness 1: “No.”
Eyewitness 2: “No, only that everybody was scared. “
Eyewitness 3: “People, police and veterans were running everywhere. All attention
was focused on the wounded and on recovering the peace. No information came to us.
“
A short movie with images from the live broadcast on Dutch National Television, can be found at: http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=0cEQp8OQj2Y. This shows how, within two minutes, the crowd starts to panic and
move.
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Fig. 4 Still image of the people on Dam Square starting to flee. The circle on the right bottom indicates the
location of the yelling person
The live broadcast of the National Remembrance on Dutch National Television has been
acquired in HD-quality.In this video, one can see the crowd on Dam Square flee from the
perspective shown in Fig. 4. The video includes the cuts and editing that were done during
the live broadcast, because the un-edited video material of all cameras that were filming that
day was not saved.
From the total broadcast, a shorter three minutes movie was made, starting the moment
when the crowd was silent and the person started to scream loudly. In this three minutes movie
there are two time slots that were further processed (11–17 and 20–27 s), because (i) they
showed the clear camera angle like the one that can be seen in Fig. 4, and (ii) the direction
and speed of the movements of people could be clearly analysed. They were analysed as
follows. The movie was cut into still images, to detect the location of people by hand. Ten
still images per second were chosen in order to be able to detect the movements of running
people frame by frame. By keeping track of the coordinates of mouse-clicks on the locations
of people in the crowd while they were moving, their trace of movement could be detected.
A total of 130 frames were analysed by hand. Not all people could be analysed, both
because of the quantity, and the impossibility to trace every ‘dot’ (person) over multiple
still images. Persons in different positions of the crowd with simultaneous movements to
the people around them were chosen, such that these target subjects were able to represent
multiple people around them. In total 35 persons were traced. See Fig. 5, for an example of
five of the persons that were traced. The red dot represents the screaming man. The five blue
lines represent the five persons that were traced. The arrows indicate in which direction the
persons ran away. The x- and y-axis contain the coordinates.
The density of the crowd around a target subject was also acquired, which could be used
to build a representative large-scale simulation consisting of ten thousands of agents. Since
the exact number of persons surrounding a target could not be distinguished in the video,
Permission granted for educational and research purposes by The Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision.
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Fig. 5 Escape directions of five persons that were traced by hand
three distinctions in density were made: high, medium and low. The size of the circle around
the target subject, in which density was measured, is shown on the right in Fig. 4.
The next step was to correct for the angle the camera makes with the floor by recalculating
the coordinates into coordinates that would fit into a bird’s-eye view on the Dam Square,
perpendicular to the floor. People’s distances in meters from corners of the buildings were
translated to the position in pixels on a 600 × 800 map of the area, using offsets and scaling.
Specifically, the following formulae are used to translate movements in pixels to movements
in meters:
xmeter = x pixel/22
ymeter = ypixel/8
This was then transformed to the map using the following formulae:
xmap = (xmeter ∗ 5.15) + 136
ymap = (ymeter ∗ 5.15) − 167
The bird’s eye view perspective used in the computational model can be seen in Fig. 6. The
resulting figure was represented in the simulation in Matlab. Locations of certain obstacles,
like buildings and fences, were also transformed into the bird’s-eye view.
7 Extending and specialising the model ASCRIBE for the May fourth case
To tailor the model ASCRIBE towards the domain introduced in Sect. 6, a number of steps
were taken.
7.1 Case specific states
First of all, the relevant states for the agents have been distinguished. In this case, the emo-
tion, belief and intention states relate to the options for each agent. A total of nine options
are available including ‘remain standing’, and moving in any wind direction (N, NE, E, SE,
S, SW, W, NW). Besides these, there is an additional belief about the current situation. This
expresses how positive a person judges the current situation (zero a negative judgment, and
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Fig. 6 600 × 800 pixel image of the Dam Square
one a positive judgment). Finally, the emotions for each option and the emotion fear are
represented.
7.2 Channel strength
In the scenario described above, the channel strengths between the various agents are depen-
dent on the physical location of the agents. If other agents are close, the channel strength is
high, whereas it is low or zero in case agents are far apart. Therefore, a threshold function was
used expressing within which reach agents still influence each other in a significant manner:
αSB A(t) = 1 − (1/1 + e−σ(distance B A(t)−τdistance))
Here σ and τdistance are global parameters and distanceB A is the Euclidean distance between
the positions (xA(t), yA(t)) and (xB(t), yB(t)) of A and B at t .
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7.3 Movement
The movement of the agents directly depends upon their intentions. Recall that the strength
of the intention is determined by the intentions of others (see Sect. 3), and the agent’s own
personality characteristics and mental states, such as beliefs and emotions (see Sect. 4).
The highest feasible intention is selected (in cases where certain movements are obstructed,
the next highest intention is selected). For each of the selected options O , the movement
xmovement (O) on the x-axis and ymovement (O) on the y-axis is specified; e.g., the option for
going south means -1 step on the y-axis and none on the x-axis: xmovement (O) = 0 and
ymovement (O) = −1. The actual point to which the agent will move is then calculated by
taking the previous point and adding the movement of the agent during a certain period to
that. The movement of the agent depends upon the strength of the intention for the selected
option and the maximum speed with which the agent can move. If the intention is maximal
(i.e., 1) the agent will move with the maximum speed. In case the intention is minimal (i.e., 0)
the agent will not move. The dependency between mental states and speed of movement has
been described in several works. It has long been acknowledged, starting with the intuitive
’fight or flight’ concept, that emotions prime the human body for action ([19,23,24,34]).
Emotions are considered to fall into two categories; those that elicit approach responses and
those that elicit withdrawal responses. It has been noted that both fear and disgust often
include behavioural components of withdrawal (e.g., [20,40]). Unpleasant cues activate the
defensive system (i.e., danger, fear), which facilitates movements away from the cue (e.g.,
[8,47]). Ekman claims that in case of fear withdrawal entails escaping from the threatening
stimulus. Quantarelli states more specifically that “panic is marked by loss of self-control,
that is, by unchecked fear, being expressed in flight” and that “panic most frequently takes
the form of actual physical running” ([41], p.272, 269). In particular, a positive correlation
between the emotion of fear and intensity of escape attempts was found (except in extremely
stressful situations, in which impairment seemed to occur) (cf. [25]). This acknowledges a
theory laid down in [35] that “it is generally assumed that level of fear is related positively
to response in a potential panic situation”. Given these underlying theories, the model that
establishes this relationship is expressed as follows:
xA(t + t) = xA(t) + max_speedA · qintention(O)A(t) · xmovement (O) · t
yA(t + t) = yA(t) + max_speedA · qintention(O)A(t) · ymovement (O) · t
Here the maximum speeds max_speedA are agent-specific parameters.
8 The parameter tuning method used
As explained above, the computational model contains a large number of parameters; these
parameters address various aspects of the agents involved, including their personality char-
acteristics (e.g., expressiveness, openness, and tendency to absorb or amplify mental states),
physical properties (e.g., minimum and maximum speed, and limit of their sight), and char-
acteristics of their mutual interactions (e.g., channel strength between sender and receiver).
The accuracy of the model (i.e., its ability to reproduce the real world data as closely as pos-
sible) heavily depends on the settings of these parameters. Therefore, parameter estimation
techniques [50] have been applied to learn the optimal values for the parameters involved.
In order to determine what is ‘optimal’, first an error measure needs to be defined. The
main goal is to reproduce the movements of the people involved in the scenario; thus it was
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decided to take the average (Euclidean) distance (over all agents and time points) between







(x (a, t, sim) − x (a, t, data))2 + (y (a, t, sim) − y (a, t, data))2
#agents · #timepoints
Here, x(a, t, sim) is the x-coordinate of agent a at time point t in the simulation, and x(a, t,
data) the same in the real data (similarly the y-coordinates). Both are in meters.
Next, the relevant parameters were tuned to reduce this error. To this end, the approach
described in detail in Sects. 3 and 4 of [4] was used. This approach makes use of the notion
of sensitivity of variables for certain parameter changes. Roughly spoken, for a given set
of parameter settings, the idea is to make small changes in one of the parameters involved,
and to observe how such a change influences the change of the variable of interest (in this
case the error). Here, ‘observing’ means running the simulation twice, i.e., once with the
original parameter settings, and once with the same settings were one parameter has slightly
changed. Formally, the sensitivity SX,P of changes X in a variable X to changes P in
a parameter P is defined as follows (note that this sensitivity is in fact the partial derivative
∂ X/∂ P) : SX,P = X/P . Based on this notion of sensitivity, the adaptation process as a
whole, is an iterative process, which roughly consists of: (1) calculating sensitivities for all
parameters under consideration, and (2) using these sensitivities to calculate new values for
all parameters. This second step is done by changing each parameter with a certain amount
P , which is determined as follows: P = −λ∗X/SX,P . Here, X is the deviation found
between actual and simulated value of variable X , and λ is a speed factor. Note that, since in
the current case X represents the error, the ‘actual value’ of X is of course 0, so X simply
equals ε in the simulation.
9 Results
This section presents the results of specialising and tuning the agent-based model with 35
agents, to the real world data of the May fourth incident. The results are presented for the first
part of the data (i.e., seconds 11–17 of the three minutes movie). To assess the performance
of the model, it was compared with three other models, which are introduced in Sect. 9.1.
Next, Sect. 9.2 explains which parameters of those models were tuned, and which parameter
settings were found. Sect. 9.3 discusses the results of running the models for the optimal
parameter settings found; in particular, for each model the increase of the error over time (of
the simulation) is shown. Sect. 9.4 discusses the statistical significance of the results, and
Sect. 9.5 illustrates the behaviour of the simulation based on the optimal models found.
9.1 Models used for comparison
To assess the performance of the ASCRIBE model, it was compared to three other models.
First, one baseline model was developed in which the agents do not move at all. Second, the
model was compared to an implementation of the model by Helbing et al. [27], which is cur-
rently one of the most influential models in the area of crowd simulation. This model has been
specifically designed for simulating dynamical features of escape panic, and is essentially a
specific variant of a social force model for pedestrian dynamics which Helbing and Molnar
introduced in 1995 [28]. It has been modelled following the framework of self-driven many
particle systems and is based on a general force model. The model assumes that each agent
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likes to move in a certain direction with a certain desired velocity. In addition however, the
agent is influenced by certain interaction forces: it wants to keep a certain distance from other
agents and walls. The model is expressed by means of a number of equations (cf. [27]), and
a very brief overview of the main equations in the model is presented here. For a complete
overview of the model, see [27]. In the first equation the change in the velocity of the agent

















This expresses that the velocity of the agent changes based upon the desired velocity (v0i (t)) ,
the desired direction (e0i (t)) , and the current velocity. Note that in the implementation of the
model, a more sophisticated variant of the desired direction has been used (cf. [28]) in which
a complete set of points to be visited can be expressed, and the desired direction depends on
the closest of these points given the current position. The forces that occur due to other agents
and walls are added to the equation as well. In the equation, the parameter mi represents the
mass of the agent, whereas τi expresses the so-called characteristic time. In order to calculate
the forces from other agents and walls, two equations are used. The first of these equations
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The equation indicates that the force between two agents is dependent upon a number of fac-
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the body force between the agents, where Ai , Bi , and k are constants. Furthermore, di j
represents the distance between the two agents, ni j is the normalized vector pointing from
agent j to agent i, and ri j is the sum of the change of positions of agent i and j. g(ri j − di j )
evaluates to zero in case the pedestrians do not touch each other (i.e. di j > ri j ) and otherwise
to ri j − di j . The second part of the equation
(
κg(ri j − di j )vtj i ti j
)
represents the so-called
sliding friction in case the pedestrians come close to each other. Here, vtj i is the tangential
velocity difference, and ti j the tangential direction.
The second equation concerns the interaction with walls and is quite similar to the equation
used for the interaction with other agents:
fiW = {Ai exp [(ri − diW ) /Bi ] + kg(ri − diW )} niW − κg (ri − diW ) (vi tiW )tiW
In this case, diW is the distance between the agent and the wall, and niW is the direction
perpendicular to the wall. Furthermore, tiW is the direction tangential to the wall.
Finally, next to the no motion model and the Helbing et al. model, a variant of ASCRIBE
was developed in which all agents also make individual decisions, but do not influence each
other (i.e., no contagion takes place). This was done to assess whether the idea and imple-
mentation of contagion of mental states is useful at all.
This resulted in three different models (in addition to our own ASCRIBE model with
contagion of mental states), to which we refer below as baseline, Helbing, and without con-
tagion, respectively. To enable a fair comparison, parameter tuning was applied for all models
(except for the baseline model, since it did not contain any parameters to tune) in order to
find optimal settings, as explained in the next section.
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Table 4 Optimal parameter settings found
Global parameters Initial variable Global parameters Initial variables
(not tuned) settings (not tuned) (tuned) (tuned)
#Agents 35 εIntention 0.5 τDistance 190 qBelief(nomove) 0.005
Max_x 600 δIntention 0.5 Sight_reach 200
Max_y 800 ηIntention 0.5 Max_speed Differs per agent
t 0.5 βIntention 0.5
μδ Belief 0.5 εBelief 0.5
μη Belief 0.5 δBelief 0.5
μβ Belief 0.5 ηBelief 0.5
ςBelief 0.5 βBelief 0.5
σ 100 εEmotion 0.5
ωOIA1 0.3 δEmotion 0.5
ωOEA2 0.3 ηEmotion 0.5










The number of parameters to tune for the full ASCRIBE model is large; therefore, before
starting the tuning process for this model, the settings for a large majority of the parameters
were fixed at default values (see Table 4). For example, parameters with a relatively small
sensitivity were left out of consideration for the tuning process (cf. [4]). For these parameters,
reasonable default settings were chosen by hand (based on experimentation). The values of
the remaining parameters (among others, the maximum speed for each individual agent, the
minimum distance within which agents influence each other, and the initial values of one of
the beliefs, see Table 4) were initialised by hand, but were then adapted using the parameter
tuning approach described in the previous section.
The speed factor λ of this tuning process was set to 0.1. The initial locations of the agents
involved were taken equal to the locations in the real world data. An overview of all optimal
settings found for the global parameters and the initial variables involved in the model is
shown in Table 4.
Here, the settings shown in the first two columns were set by hand, and the settings shown
in the last two columns were found after tuning. Note that all settings (except those for
maximum speed) were used globally for all agents.
For the model without contagion, the tuned parameters were the same as for the full model
with contagion. For the Helbing model, the parameters that were tuned were also the desired




, as well as the global parameters characteristic time
(τi ) and the difference between the points to be visited (representing the path the agent
want to follow). Moreover, for the parameters A, B, k and κ , the settings as prescribed in
their article [27] were taken and as desired direction e0i (t) the direction precisely opposite to
123




















Fig. 7 Development of error over the simulation for four variants of the model. Each time step corresponds
to a video frame, which were processed every 0.1 s
the location of the shouting man was selected, and points were generated which form a path
away from this location (thereby setting the desired direction to the closest point as explained
before). The distance between these points depended on the setting of the parameter. For all
models, the tuning was continued until the improvements made per iteration were smaller
than 0.1 %.
9.3 Increase of error over time
Figure 7 shows for each of the four variants how the average error (over all agents) increases
during the simulation.
Note that the error is expressed in meters. At the first time point, the error is zero (all
agents start at their actual position), but over time the error increases very quickly in the
baseline case, so that the error at the last time step of the simulation becomes quite large
(2.35 m). For this model, the average error per time step is 0.87 m. The average error found
for the tuned model without contagion is much lower (0.66, i.e., an improvement of 24%),
and is even lower for the tuned model with contagion (0.54, i.e., an improvement of 38 %).
This finding provides evidence for the conclusion that incorporating the contagion makes the
model more accurate, even when it is based on default settings for the parameters. Note that
in the current scenario, the agents’ movements involve relatively small steps, compared to the
size of the grid; the total distance that the agents travel during the 7 seconds of analysis is only
2.35 m. Therefore, the relative errors found (i.e., the percentages of improvement mentioned
above) are more insightful that the absolute errors. In case the total distance travelled would
have been larger, the absolute difference in performance between the four models would be
expected to have been bigger as well.
As for the Helbing model, the average error of this model per time step was found to be
0.59 (i.e., an improvement of 32 % w.r.t. the baseline model). As can be observed from Fig. 7,
this model performs better than the model without contagion, but worse than the model with
contagion (at least, in this particular scenario). One of the main reasons for this is that the
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model with contagion seems to be better able to deal with the fact that some agents only start
moving half way the scenario. This phenomenon, which is also well visible in the video of
the event, is caused by the fact that the crowd is separated by fences (see also Fig. 4), and
especially the people that are located on the left hand side of the area wait a couple of seconds
before they start moving, whereas other people start moving right after the scream. In the
model with contagion, this phenomenon can be reproduced quite accurately by means of the
contagion mechanism: the agents at the left hand side of the area initially have a low level of
fear (since they are not directly affected by the screaming man), but only when they observe
other agents panicking and trying to escape, they are influenced by them and attempt to get
away as well. Since the Helbing model does not include an explicit mechanism for conta-
gion of mental states, it has more difficulties in reproducing this particular effect (because
in this model, the speed by which the agents move is more stable - although not completely
constant—over time). Therefore, for the Helbing model, the parameter tuning resulted in an
optimal situation where some agents on the left hand side hardly move at all. This is reflected
by the fact that the error for this model (compared to the model with contagion) only increases
in the last eight time steps.
When comparing the Helbing model with the model without emotion, one can observe
that, although the errors of both models at time point 45 are comparable, the Helbing model
performs slightly better when taking the overall average error over all time points. This can
in part be explained by the fact that the Helbing model has more freedom when it comes
to selecting the direction in which the agents move. In our model (both with and without
contagion), selection of actions has been implemented in such a way that the agents can
only pick one out of eight wind directions (see Sect. 7), whereas the Helbing model uses a
continuous scale for this. We speculate that the performance of our model (both with and
without contagion) may be further improved by changing this discrete mechanism for action
selection into a continuous mechanism.
In order to provide some more insight in the variance of the error over the 35 agents,
additional graphs have been generated which show the standard error of the mean (σ/√n,
i.e., the standard deviation divided by the square root of the number of agents) at each time
point for all models; see Fig. 8. These graphs show that the standard error is relatively
small, which implies that errors are fairly distributed over the 35 agents, although there are
some outliers (between 1 and 2.5 standard deviations), see next section. They also show
that the standard error is largest for the baseline model, and smallest for the model with
contagion.
9.4 Statistical analysis
A two-way within-subjects analysis of variance was conducted to evaluate the effect of the
type of computational crowd behaviour model on deviation from the walking direction in the
real world scenario. The analysis has been conducted for all time points of the simulation, for
35 agents. The dependent variable was the deviation from the walking direction in the real
world scenario data named ‘error’, which was measured in meters. The within-subjects fac-
tors were type of crowd behaviour models, with four levels (Baseline, Helbing, ASCRIBE
model without contagion, ASCRIBE model with contagion) and time with 47 levels (47
time steps of the simulations. Note that the models are deterministic, so that the source of
variation comes from the agent population in each model and not from different runs of
each model. The question that is investigated is whether the movement patterns of the agent
population differs for each model, using the same initial values, but different contagion and
influence mechanisms. The main effects and interactions were tested using the univariate
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Fig. 8 Standard error at each time point for the four models
Huyhnh-Feldt analysis that corrects for non-sphericity. The Model main effect was signifi-
cant, F(1.4, 48.2) = 5.7, p < 0.012, the Time main effect was significant, F(1.3, 45.6)= 26.1,
p=0.012, and the ModelxTime interaction effect was significant, F(2.5, 87.5)= 6.7, p=0.001.
To further inspect which models differ significantly from each other, each combination of
two models was tested with post hoc pairwise comparisons with LSD adjustment for signifi-
cance on the p < 0.05 level. Significant differences were found between Baseline and Helbing,
p < 0.05, Baseline and ASCRIBE with contagion, p < 0.05, ASCRIBE without contagion and
ASCRIBE with contagion, p < 0.001, and a trend was found between Baseline and ASCRIBE
without contagion, p=0.074. No significant difference was found between ASCRIBE with
contagion and Helbing, p=0.322 and between Helbing and ASCRIBE without contagion,
p=0.171.
These results seem to point in the direction that all models differ significantly, except
Helbing from ASCRIBE with contagion and Helbing from ASCRIBE without contagion.
Indeed, in Fig. 7, Helbing and ASCRIBE without contagion do seem to behave alike, but
Helbing and ASCRIBE with contagion seem to differ substantially. We feel that when there
would be more timesteps available in the real world data, the Helbing model would differ
significantly from ASCRIBE with contagion, and perhaps even from ASCRIBE without con-
tagion. Furthermore, when investigating the data further, two outliers can be found that differ
between one and two standard deviations of the other 33 agents. (In Fig. 9 it can be seen that
each model always has minimum one or two agents that behave very differently from the
rest). When these two outliers are removed, all previously found significant differences stay
significant (on the p < 0.01 level), the difference between Helbing and ASCRIBE without
contagion is still not significant, p= 0.38, and a trend becomes visible between Helbing and
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Fig. 9 Individual agent’s error per model
Fig. 10 Summed errors for all agents, per model, per half of simulation
ASCRIBE with contagion, p=0.054. These results point into the direction that all models
differ significantly from each other in this scenario, except Helbing and ASCRIBE without
contagion.
A second research question to be analysed statistically is: do the four computational
models differ significantly on the second half of the simulation, compared to the first half
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of the simulation. This research question stems from the fact that in the second half of
the simulation the whole mass of people is moving, compared to the first half of the sim-
ulation, where only the right half of the mass starts to move. In this way, the data has
two distinct time points that can be compared, by summing up all data points per model,
per half of the simulation. A two-way within-subjects analysis of variance was conducted
to evaluate the effect of type of computational crowd behaviour model on deviation from
the walking direction in the real world scenario on two time points: the first and second
half of the simulation. See Fig. 10 for an overview of the summed errors per model, per
time step. The within-subjects factors were type of crowd behaviour model with four lev-
els (Baseline, Helbing, ASCRIBE model without contagion, ASCRIBE model with conta-
gion) and time with two levels (the summed first half and second half of the simulation).
The main effects and interactions were tested using the univariate Huyhnh-Feldt analysis
that corrects for non-sphericity. The model main effect was significant, F(1, 35.3)= 8.9,
p = 0.005, the time main effect was significant, F(1,34)=77.9, p < 0.001, and the model
× time interaction effect was significant, F(1.1, 36.2)=10.5, p=0.002. To further inspect
which models differ significantly from each other, each combination of two models was
tested with post hoc pairwise comparisons with LSD adjustment for significance on the
p < 0.05 level. Significant differences were found between all models: Baseline and Hel-
bing, p < 0.01, Baseline and ASCRIBE without contagion, p < 0.05, Baseline and ASCRIBE
with contagion, p < 0.001, Helbing and ASCRIBE without contagion, p < 0.001, Helbing
and ASCRIBE with contagion, p < 0.001, ASCRIBE without contagion and ASCRIBE with
contagion, p < 0.001.
9.5 Resulting behaviour of the simulation
After the tuning process was finished, the optimal settings found for all parameters were used
as input for the four simulation models, to generate simulation traces which closely resemble
the real world scenario. Using visualisation software (written in Matlab), these simulation
traces have been visualised in the form of a 2D animation. A screenshot of the animation of
the model with contagion is shown in Fig. 11.
Here, the lines represent fences that were used to control the crowd, the large circle rep-
resents the monument on the square (see Fig. 4 for the actual situation), and the big dots
represent corners of other buildings. The plus sign on the right indicates the location of the
screaming man. The small dots represent the actual locations of the 35 people in the crowd
that were tracked, and the stars represent the locations of the corresponding agents in the
simulation. Even at the end of the simulation (see Fig. 11), the distances between the real
and simulated positions are fairly small for this model.
10 Comparison to an epidemiological-based contagion model
As described in detail in Sects. 3 and 4, the ASCRIBE model presented in this paper is an
interaction-based model that draws from social contagion theories of emotion and other men-
tal states, such as beliefs and intentions. The final model resembles the dynamics properties
as they are found in thermodynamic systems, for example heat diffusion by the interaction of
bodies and radiation. A different approach to modelling contagion is used by epidemiological
models, which are traditionally well suited to describe phenomena such as the disease spread
See http://www.few.vu.nl/~tbosse/may4/. This URL contains two animations: one in which only the result of
the model with contagion is shown, and one in which the results of all four models are shown together.
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Fig. 11 Screenshot of the simulation. Units displayed on the axes are in pixels, where 5.15 pixels equals 1 m
(e.g., [17]) or innovation diffusion [46], but are also heavily applied to different types of
social contagion (e.g., [49]). One example of an epidemiological model that has been applied
to social contagion is the Durupinar model [18]. This model uses probabilistic thresholds to
determine the likelihood of emotion ‘infections’ between people in social interactions.
In recent work, Tsai et al. [52] have compared the ASCRIBE and the Durupinar model
in an evacuation simulation where both models were tested on their ability to reproduce the
dynamics that occurred in an existing crowd panic scene. The simulation was run in ESCAPES
[53], which is a multiagent evacuation simulation tool that features different agent types and
emotional, informational and behavioural interactions. For this comparison, an earlier and
simpler version of ASCRIBE (as presented in [2]), was used. This model does not include
the dynamics between emotions, intentions and beliefs, but focuses only on the spread of
emotions. Tsai et al. did however expand the simpler version with a proximity effect that is
similar to the one used in the extended ASCRIBE model described in this paper (see Sect. 7).
First, a simulation was run that included 100 pedestrians, who experience a fearful event
and as a result are trying to find an exit in a large hallway, The results show that the
ASCRIBE model was able to produce more realistic dynamics than the Duruprinar model.
In the ASCRIBE model, the proximity effect ensured that agents could only be affected by
others in their proximity, whereas in the Durupinar model, contagion was able to spread
through the entire population immediately. See [52] for a detailed discussion of these results.
Second, the ASCRIBE model was compared to both the Durupinar model and the
ESCAPES model, as a baseline comparison. The ESCAPES model uses a basic model of
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Table 5 Average error (in pixels) in the Amsterdam simulation (table adapted from Tsai et al. [52])
Overall Near Overall Near Overall Near Overall Near
(a) Base models





No speed 0.381 0.721





No speed 0.387 0.767




No decay 0.387 0.771
Speed 0.388 0.784
Prox 0.380 0.754
emotion contagion wherein agents inherit the highest fear level of neighbouring agents. The
simulations were based on two real scenes: the Amsterdam 4 May scene as described in
Sect. 6, and recent protests in Greece, where officers fired tear gas in the middle of a small
crowd. In both scenarios, the ASCRIBE model performs equal and mostly superior to the
other models, outperforming the Durupinar model with 14 % less error per agent per frame in
the Amsterdam scenario, and 12 % less error per agent per frame in the Greece scenario. See
Table 5 en 6 (adapted from [52]) for the average errors in pixels (compared to the original
video’s). Each model shows errors for all agents (‘overall’) and agents near to the catalyzing
event (‘near’). The models were run in different parameter settings: as given, with imple-
mentations of ‘decay’ turned on/off, with emotional level impacting speed ignored, and with
proximity effects turned off. For a discussion on the scenarios, settings and results please
refer to [52].
These results show that the underlying mechanisms used in the ASCRIBE contagion
model are well suited to model these kind of contagion problems. It seems that in this case
the combination of the proximity effect and the mirroring of emotional states yields the
most promising results. Future studies will have to show whether the addition of belief and
intention dynamics are able to further decrease the error rate.
11 Discussion
This paper has presented the computational model ASCRIBE for collective decision mak-
ing based on neural mechanisms revealed by recent developments in social neuroscience;
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Table 6 Average error (in pixels)
in the Greece simulation (table
























e.g., [6,7,16,26,33]. These mechanisms explain how mutual adaptation of individual mental
states can be realized by social interaction. They do not only enable intentions to converge
to an emerging common decision, but at the same time enable to achieve shared underlying
individual beliefs and emotions. Therefore a situation can be achieved in which a common
decision that for each individual is considered in agreement with the own beliefs and feelings
can be made, thus achieving a solid personal grounding and robustness of the decision. More
specifically, this model for collective design making involves on the one hand individual
beliefs, emotions and intentions, and on the other hand interaction with others involving mir-
roring of such mental states; e.g., [33,45,51]. As shown in Fig. 1 and in Table 1, the model
involves seven types of interactions: three types of mirroring interactions between different
persons, and within each person four types of interactions between the individual mental
states. By exploiting knowledge from social neuroscience a biologically plausible, human-
like agent-based computational model was obtained, as was aimed for. Such a model can be
used not only for prediction, but also to gain insight in the dynamics of social interaction
mechanisms and their emergent properties as described informally in a noncomputational
manner in neurological literature.
In earlier work presented in [31] a simpler model for decision making was introduced in
which only decision options and emotions associated to them, and their mutual interaction
play a role, and no fear, nor interactions with beliefs. This model covers only three of the seven
types of interaction of the currently presented model. The overlap is mainly in the somatic
marking of intentions for decision options. In [29] a model was introduced in which only
emotions and information and their mutual interaction play a role, and no decision-making.
The equations for the dynamics of δ, η, and β were adopted from this paper.
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Moreover, it was discussed how empirical data has been extracted from available video
material and witness reports of the May 4 incident in Amsterdam. Qualitative data about
escape panics are rare [27]. Based on these data, it is possible to compare models for crowd
behaviour with qualitative data of a real panicking event. In this paper, ASCRIBE has been
adapted to construct a model for behaviour in a crowd when a panic spiral occurs. Experi-
ments have been performed in which the model was compared to three other models, namely
(1) a baseline model where the agents do not move at all, (2) a model by Helbing et al. [27],
and (3) a variant of the model where parameters related to contagion were set in such a way
that there was no contagion at all; in this case the movement of individuals is only deter-
mined by their individual state. In the full ASCRIBE model, mutual influencing took place
because emotions, beliefs and intentions were spreading to persons nearby. When comparing
the simulations of the four models with the most optimal settings for certain parameters,
the variant with contagion had the lowest average error rate per time step (0.54 instead of
0.59, 0.66, and 0.87 for Helbing, without contagion, and baseline, respectively). Statistical
analysis confirmed the significant differences between the models, in particular for the sec-
ond part of the scenario. Thus, it is shown that the contagion of mental states is an essential
element to model the behaviour of crowds in panic situations.
As discussed in Sect. 9, the added value of the contagion of mental states can be exploited
well in the chosen scenario, because of some specific characteristics of this scenario. In par-
ticular, the fact that part of the crowd stands still during the first part of the scenario, and only
starts to move after they observe (and are probably influenced by) the behaviour of others is
a phenomenon that is well suited to be simulated by means of contagion mechanisms. Based
upon our analysis, this is the main reason why the ASCRIBE model performs better than the
other three models (in which these mechanisms are lacking) in this experiment. Note that
this does not necessarily mean that it performs better than, e.g., the Helbing model in other
scenarios. A more extensive comparison between these two models for various new scenarios
would be an interesting direction for follow-up research.
Previous works have presented several models for crowd behaviour. As mentioned above,
an influential paper has been written by Helbing and colleagues [27], in which a mathemat-
ical model for crowd behaviour in a panic situation is presented, based on physics theories
and socio-psychological literature. This model is based on the principle of particle systems,
in which forces and collision preventions between particles are important. This approach is
often used for simulating crowd behaviour in virtual environments [48,54]. In [5] the model
of [27] is extended by adding individual characteristics to agents, such as the need for help
and family membership. In both models, there are no individual emotion, belief and intention
states that play a role. In contrast, in [36] an agent has an ‘emotional status’, which determines
whether agents walk together (i.e. it influences group formation). The emotional status of
an agent can change when to agents meet. An even further elaborated role of emotional and
psychological aspects in a crowd behaviour model can be found in [38]. In this model, several
psychological aspects influence the decision making of individual agents, for example, moti-
vation, stress, coping, personality and culture. In none of the models presented above, there is
contagion of emotional or other mental states between people. Also, no evaluation with real
qualitative data has been performed. One of the most developed tools for crowd simulation,
which also incorporates mental states, is ESCAPES [53]. This system, which specifically
targets evacuation scenarios, has several similarities with the approach shown here. In Sec-
tion 10 results of a previous study are shown that compares the ASCRIBE model with the
ESCAPE model and the epidemiological-based Durupinar model [52]. These results show
that the ASCRIBE model is well equipped to model realistic contagion of emotions. Future
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work will explore the possibilities to incorporate the detailed mechanisms for contagion of
mental states presented here into ESCAPES.
Moreover, in the future, further parameter tuning experiments are planned to study the
effect of the parameters that were fixed as default values in the current experiments. The
aim is to explore whether even more realistic simulations can be achieved by exploiting the
details of the model for contagion of emotions, beliefs and intentions in a more differentiated
form. This work has, for reasons of simplicity and clarity, focused on homogeneous groups
of agents. However, the model accounts for various personality settings. Further research
will examine how persons with different personalities can influence the contagion process.
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